Smoked Out: Bars, Restaurants, and Restrictive Antismoking Laws as Regulatory Takings by Danella, Nicholas A.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 81 | Issue 3 Article 7
3-1-2006
Smoked Out: Bars, Restaurants, and Restrictive
Antismoking Laws as Regulatory Takings
Nicholas A. Danella
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas A. Danella, Smoked Out: Bars, Restaurants, and Restrictive Antismoking Laws as Regulatory Takings, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1095 (2006).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol81/iss3/7
NOTES
SMOKED OUT: BARS, RESTAURANTS, AND
RESTRICTIVE ANTISMOKING LAWS AS
REGULATORY TAKINGS
Nicholas A. Danella*
INTRODUCTION
Walking around New York City on a weekend, you may wonder
about the crowds of people standing outside some of the most famed
nightspots in the world. Do not be discouraged if it is a bite to eat or a
cold beer that you are after-these are not long lines of people wait-
ing to enter. If it is a cigarette to which you are looking forward, how-
ever, then you may as well keep on walking. The New York state
legislature banned smoking in all public indoor areas in 2003.1 To
protect patrons and employees from the dangers of secondhand
smoke, the Smoke-Free Air Act prohibits smoking in bars and restau-
rants and forces throngs of people outside to have a cigarette.
New York, Connecticut, Maine, Delaware, Massachusetts, and
Rhode Island have all followed California's example and passed laws
that ban smoking in all restaurants and bars (what this Note calls "re-
strictive antismoking laws"). 2 In addition, more than seventy munici-
palities throughout the United States have passed similar bans.
3
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2006; A.B., English and
American Literature and Language, Harvard College, 2001. I would like to thank
Professor John C. Nagle for his helpful comments and suggestions and everyone in
my Danella, Harvey, and LaPointe families for everything else-especially Mom and
Guy.
1 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-n to -x (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2005).
2 Eli Sanders, Last Gasp, STRANGER, July 8-14, 2004, at 20, 20. On March 1, 2005,
Rhode Island joined this group and imposed its own restrictive antismoking law. To-
BACCO CONTROL PROGRAM, R.I. DEP'T OF HEALTH, PREPARING FOR A SMOKEFREE RHODE
ISLAND: A GUIDE FOR RESTAURANTS AND BARS (2004), available at http://www.health.
state.ri.us/disease/tobacco/sfwpl/SFWPLrestaurant brochure.pdf.
3 Sanders, supra note 2, at 20.
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Nonsmoking patrons cheer the clean air that has replaced these once
smoke-filled establishments, and reports suggest that employee health
has improved for workers in bars and restaurants. 4
Yet, regardless of how you feel about smoking, its health effects,
or a smoke-filled versus smoke-free bar or restaurant, the question re-
mains whether legislatures have the authority to pass these restrictive
antismoking laws without compensating property owners for potential
loss. On the one hand, a state will argue that it may do so simply as an
exercise of its police power in protecting the general welfare of the
people. However, these laws must also comply with the strictures of
the U.S. Constitution. While restrictive antismoking laws have faced
many constitutional challenges in recent years, this Note focuses ex-
clusively on the Fourteenth Amendment issue of regulatory takings. 5
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state governments from
taking private property, through actual condemnation or effectively
through excessive regulation, withoutjustly compensating the owner. 6
Using New York's 2003 Smoke-Free Air Act 7 as representative of re-
strictive antismoking laws nationwide, this Note argues that bar and
restaurant owners can make out a successful case that these absolute
bans effect a regulatory taking of their property. Part I briefly outlines
the law of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, eminent domain,
and regulatory takings. It focuses on the balancing factors that a po-
tential plaintiff bar or restaurant owner would employ to support his
case for a regulatory taking. Part II sets out the case for restrictive
antismoking laws as regulatory takings, applying the aforementioned
balancing factors and examining both recent statistical data and case
4 New York's one-year review of its Smoke-Free Air Act states that "[1]evels of
cotinine, a by-product of tobacco, decreased by 85% in nonsmoking workers in bars
and restaurants; and 150,000 fewer New Yorkers are exposed to second-hand smoke
on the job" because of the state's restrictive antismoking law. NEWYORK CITY DEP'T OF
FIN. ET AL., THE STATE OF SMOKE-FREE NEW YoRK Ciw:. A ONE-YEAR REVIEW 1 (2004)
[hereinafter ONE-YEAR REVIEW]. Perhaps ironically, this author includes himself
among those nonsmoking patrons who cheer these laws and their positive health ef-
fects. My personal preference for a smoke-free bar or restaurant notwithstanding,
restrictive anti-smoking laws effectively take privately owned property from owners
who are thus legally entitled to just compensation.
5 Restrictive antismoking laws have faced challenges under both the First
Amendment (freedom of association and even freedom of speech) and Fourteenth
Amendment (equal protection). All such challenges have failed. These bans often
survive as an exercise of the state's police power. See generally Lexington Fayette
County Food & Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d
745, 752 (Ky. 2004) ("The fact that an exercise of police power impinges upon private
interest does not restrict reasonable regulation.").
6 Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-41 (1897).
7 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 1399-n to -x (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2005).
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law. Ultimately, this Note concludes that the applicable legal factors
and property principles overwhelm the states' health interest and that
bar and restaurant owners are consequently entitled to just compensa-
tion for their loss.
I. THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
A. The Requirement of Just Compensation
1. Government Takings
Eminent domain is the "power of government to force transfers
of property from owners to itself."8 Certain restrictions apply, how-
ever, to this governmental authority.9 The Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution instructs, "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." 10 While this limits federal ac-
tion, the Fourteenth Amendment holds state governments to the
same standard. It enjoins that "[n] o state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."" In addition, several state con-
stitutions require just compensation for takings.' 2 As a simple exam-
ple: if the State of New York condemns a portion of a homeowner's
front lawn in order to build a new highway (presumably satisfying the
public use requirement), then the State must fairly reimburse the
homeowner for the land he has lost (just compensation).
Contrast the above example with the case of a regulatory taking.
Here the question is "whether a taking has occurred in consequence of
some government activity."' 3 Rather than physically seize land, the
government effectively does so through some action. Assuming the
example homeowner above lives instead on an existing roadway, the
State of New York may install a road sign on his front lawn (again,
8 JESSE DUKEMINIER &JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1093 (5th ed. 2002).
9 Id.
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V. "Virtually all state constitutions have similar language;
in any event, the Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 8, at 1093
n.2; see also Chi., Burlington & Quincy PLR., 166 U.S. at 233-41.
11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12 Most relevant for purposes of this Note, every state that currently imposes a
restrictive antismoking law on bar and restaurant owners provides such constitutional
protection. See CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 19; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 11; DEL. CONST. art. I,
§ 8; ME. CONST. art I, § 21; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7; R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 16.
13 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 8, at 1116.
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presumably for the public use). The front lawn still belongs to the
homeowner, but the state has forced him to allow for this sign on his
private property. The Fourteenth Amendment would require the
state government to justly compensate the homeowner for this ac-
tion.14 While the State has not seized the land, its action constitutes a
regulatory taking.15
2. Just Compensation Under Lingle
In its most recent foray into the law of regulatory takings, the
Supreme Court was careful to differentiate a takings challenge from
the more general due process challenge. The proper inquiry, the
Court states in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,16 is one into the "chal-
lenged regulation's effect on private property ... [and not its] under-
lying validity."'1 7  The Court continues: the "Takings Clause
presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit of a valid public
purpose.... It does not bar government from interfering with prop-
erty rights, but rather requires compensation 'in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking. ' " 8 In short, the Takings
Clause "'does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead
places a condition on the exercise of that power."' 19
After Lingle, bar and restaurant owners would be remiss to argue
that restrictive antismoking laws are unconstitutional under the Tak-
ings Clause. Any such argument would essentially stand as a due pro-
cess challenge dressed with inappropriate clothes. Restrictive
antismoking laws aim to protect people in public indoor areas, includ-
ing bar and restaurant employees, from the harms of secondhand
smoke. Accordingly, any due process challenge would most likely fail.
What the Takings Clause protects instead is an owner's right to just
compensation if the government effectively takes his real property.
14 Chi., Burlington & Quincy RR., 166 U.S. at 233-41.
15 This is an example of a permanent physical occupation, which "is always a tak-
ing, no matter how inconsequential or trivial the invasion." DUKEMINIER & KRIER,
supra note 8, at 1130; see also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that cable installations on the roof and side of a build-
ing are takings).
16 125 S. Ct. 2074 (2005).
17 Id. at 2084.
18 Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)). "Conversely, if a government action is found to be
impermissible-for instance because it fails to meet the 'public use' requirement or is
so arbitrary as to violate due process-that is the end of the inquiry. No amount of
compensation can authorize such action." Id.
19 Id. at 2080 (quoting First English, 482 U.S. at 314).
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While restrictive antismoking laws thus appear to be constitutional,
owners who suffer a regulatory taking on account of these laws are
nevertheless entitled to just compensation.
B. Regulatory Takings and Penn Central
After the Supreme Court decision in Lingle, government regula-
tion may result in a taking through only three paradigms. 20 First,
where the government compels an owner to suffer a permanent physi-
cal occupation on his land, as discussed in the example above of the
New York homeowner.21 Second, where an "owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in
the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economi-
cally idle, he has suffered a taking."22
Clearly, restrictive antismoking laws do not effect a permanent
physical invasion of bar and restaurant owners' property. Just as
clearly, restrictive antismoking laws do not deprive bar and restaurant
owners of all economically beneficial uses of their property-non-
smoking customers, as well as smokers who abstain from smoking
while in a bar or restaurant, continue to frequent bars and restaurants
for drinks and food. Thus, the case for restrictive antismoking laws as
regulatory takings must rely upon the third paradigm.
The landmark Supreme Court case of Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City23 governs a regulatory taking challenge under this
third paradigm. The test that the Supreme Court has outlined con-
sists of several factors. Primary among these factors are the "'extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations"' and the "'economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant."' 24 Additionally, the "'character of the governmental ac-
tion' . . . may be relevant in discerning whether a taking has oc-
20 This leaves aside the "special context of land-use exactions." Id. at 2081. See
generally Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
21 See supra Part I.A.1. Another is the rule that "if a government action in ques-
tion is depicted as a nuisance-control measure, then there is no taking notwithstand-
ing the loss worked by the regulation." DUKEMINIER & KR1ER, supra note 8, at 1138; see
also Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915). In Hadacheck the Court upheld
against a takings claim a Los Angeles ordinance making it unlawful to establish or
operate a brick yard, brick kiln, or any place for the manufacture or burning of brick
within city limits. Id. at 404. No court has ruled that antismoking laws fall under
nuisance control in the context of regulatory takings.
22 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
23 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
24 Lingle, 125 S. Ct. at 2081-82 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
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curred. ' 25 This Note now details these factors (and one related
factor) before then holding up restrictive antismoking laws to the
Penn Central standards.
1. Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
The first factor, sometimes seen as an element within the eco-
nomic impact question, 26 focuses on the owner rather than the prop-
erty alone. The court analyzes an owner's expectations as to the use
of his land and the extent to which government regulation has inter-
fered with these plans. As the Supreme Court says, "a state statute that
substantially furthers important public policies may so frustrate dis-
tinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to a 'taking."' 27
Property owners invest in land and development with certain expecta-
tions in mind, and laws affect these expectations. Nevertheless, the
court may find a regulatory taking in cases where "'distinct invest-
ment-backed expectations' are defeated by government regulatory ac-
tion that sharply reverses a prior governmental stance upon which the
aggrieved owner specifically and justifiably relied by investing in the
particular advantage that the questioned regulation would remove or
destroy."28
An owner can argue that the government has effectively taken his
land when subsequent government regulation goes beyond that in ef-
fect when the owner had originally invested in the land. The owner
relied upon these laws when investing in the land and planning for its
expected uses. Regulation that interferes with these expectations may
constitute a regulatory taking. Moreover, the value of these expecta-
tions as property interests may trump "important public policies"29
that the state offers to justify its actions. Government regulation that
interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations strongly sup-
ports a potential plaintiff's case for a regulatory taking.
2. Economic Impact, Diminution in Value
The second factor looks at the economic effect that regulation
has on property. Stated simply, the court may find a taking if govern-
25 Id. at 2082 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
26 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 8, at 1167-68 ("Is the test... different from
the diminution-in-value test?"); see infra Part I.B.2.
27 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (discussing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922)).
28 Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1604 n.21 (1987).
29 For example, a state's interest in protecting the health interests of
nonsmokers.
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ment regulations "deny an owner economically viable use of his
land."30 Apart from a complete economic taking, discussed above, 31 a
"less intrusive regulation" may allow a property owner "some but not
all economic use of his land (sometimes called a partial or non-cate-
gorical taking). "32
In the landmark case Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,33 the Su-
preme Court relied on this diminution-in-value test in finding a regu-
latory taking. The Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute, prohibited the
mining of anthracite coal that threatened surface habitations with po-
tential subsidence.3 4 However, Pennsylvania had previously recog-
nized the right to mine coal as a valuable estate in land,3 5 one upon
which this regulation drastically impinged. Justice Holmes states that
"[w]hat makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine cer-
tain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it."36
Owners derived value from this subterranean land in mining its
coal. The Kohler Act prohibited this land use and consequently di-
minished the value of the land. The government had effectively taken
this land in regulating the right to use it. Thus, regulation that dimin-
ishes the economic value of property may constitute a regulatory
taking.
3. Character of the Governmental Action
Also relevant to the Penn Central analysis is the nature of the gov-
ernmental regulation that arguably effects a taking; for example,
"whether it amounts to a physical invasion or instead merely affects
property interests through 'some public program adjusting the bene-
fits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good."' 3 7
Courts are more willing to rule that governmental action constitutes a
30 D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 292 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)), aff'd, 393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir.
2005).
31 See supra text accompanying note 22.
32 D.A.B.E., 292 F. Supp. 2d at 971 (citing Anderson v. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti,
266 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 2001)).
33 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
34 Id. at 412-13.
35 Id. at 414 (citing Commonwealth ex rel. Keator v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A.
820, 820 (Pa. 1917)).
36 Id.
37 Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2082 (2005) (quoting Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
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taking when the government physically invades an owner's property.
It is more difficult for a potential plaintiff to argue that government
regulation leading to economic, nonphysical interference with an
owner's property effects a taking. Essentially, takings law "aims to
identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the clas-
sic taking in which government directly appropriates private property
or ousts the owner from his domain." 38
4. Conceptual Severance
A related factor separates out the different property interests that
an owner holds in his land and asks whether regulation has effectively
taken any single interest, perhaps without upsetting the others. This
idea is known as "conceptual severance. '3 9 Proving a regulatory tak-
ing with this factor "consists of delineating a property interest consist-
ing of just what the government action has removed from the owner,
and then asserting that that particular whole thing has been perma-
nently taken. '40 Consider the Kohler Act, discussed above, 41 as per-
manently taking the whole right to mine coal on an owner's land.
Accordingly, the idea of conceptual severance would enforce the
finding of a regulatory taking in Pennsylvania Coal,42 as government
regulation effectively seized a single property interest. While regula-
tion may not interfere with the whole of an owner's property interests,
if the owner can prove that the government has effectively taken one
such interest then the owner may make a case for a regulatory taking.
5. An Ad Hoc Determination
However, the Supreme Court "quite simply, has been unable to
develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness'
require that economic injuries caused by public action be compen-
sated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately con-
centrated on a few persons. '43 Courts consequently analyze the
38 Id. at 2082.
39 MargaretJane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Juris-
prudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988) ("Thus, this strategy hypo-
thetically or conceptually 'severs' from the whole bundle of rights just those strands
that are interfered with by the regulation, and then hypothetically or conceptually
construes those strands in the aggregate as a separate whole thing.").
40 Id.
41 See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
42 Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
43 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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particular circumstances and make an ad hoc determination as to
whether government action has wrought a regulatory taking.44
The Supreme Court in Penn Central explicitly stated, however,
that interference with distinct investment-backed expectations and
diminution in value are among the factors that have "particular signif-
icance" in making this determination. 45 One cannot definitively pre-
dict how the court would decide every case in which plaintiffs argue
for restrictive antismoking laws as regulatory takings; the determina-
tion is too fact specific. This Note nevertheless sets out the best case
that potential plaintiffs could urge upon the court.
II. RESTRICTIVE ANTISMOKING LAWS AS REGULATORY TAKINGS
Applying the above factors, 46 this Note argues that in certain fac-
tual scenarios restrictive antismoking laws constitute regulatory tak-
ings. These laws ban smoking in all public indoor areas and
effectively take bar and restaurant owners' land. Subsequently, this
government action requires just compensation to injured property
owners.
A. Land-Use Regulation
Before analyzing the specifics of restrictive antismoking laws as
takings, this Note must clear an initial hurdle. Any discussion of regu-
latory takings presumes that the government action in question affects
the use of land.4 7 Consequently, the court must find restrictive antis-
moking laws to be land-use regulations before ruling that such laws
constitute takings.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 See supra Part I.B.
47 A survey of cases dealing with restrictive antismoking laws reveals that courts
choose to sidestep this issue. See, e.g., D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 292 F. Supp. 2d
968, 972 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2003) ("A survey of takings law reveals that nearly every
takings case deals with a land-use regulation. I will assume without deciding that the
[restrictive antismoking] ordinance at issue here, while not technically a land-use reg-
ulation, is sufficiently analogous to such regulations that the same legal principles
apply."), affd, 393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005); City of Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675,
684 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (assuming that the restrictive antismoking "ordinance some-
how constitutes a land use regulation rather than a health provision that merely regu-
lates conduct" before analyzing the takings claim); Found. for Indep. Living, Inc. v.
Cabell-Huntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d 744, 754 (W. Va. 2003) (limiting implic-
itly "application of this constitutional provision [West Virginia's equivalent to the
Fifth Amendment] to various situations involving land-use regulation").
2o06] 110 3
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Justice John William Graves, sitting on the Supreme Court of
Kentucky, offers perhaps the best explanation for why the court
should treat restrictive antismoking laws as land-use regulations. 48 Jus-
tice Graves argues that the Lexington-Fayette County ordinance ban-
ning smoking in all public indoor areas requires just compensation to
property owners. 49 Justice Graves states that the "ordinance is oppres-
sive because it operates as a regulatory partial taking of private prop-
erty without just compensation." 50 It warrants mentioning that this
restrictive antismoking law struck Justice Graves so forcefully as consti-
tuting a regulatory taking that he raised the issue sua sponte in pen-
ning the lone dissent to an opinion that upheld the restrictive
antismoking law.51
In support of the notion that the restrictive antismoking law rep-
resents land-use regulation, Justice Graves writes:
Use is an essential attribute of ownership....
The actions of the Lexington-Fayette Urban County Govern-
ment are comparable to those in centrally-planned economies
where property tends to be managed by the state and government
officials decide how to use those resources. The system of private
property ownership works best when the individual holds the right
to manage his property....
48 See Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Ur-
ban County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Ky. 2004) (Graves, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the restrictive antismoking law in question is unconstitutional).
49 Id. The ordinance allowed for limited exceptions "such as dwellings and gov-
ernment buildings." Id. at 749 (majority opinion). Justice Graves "would strike down
the ordinance as being arbitrary and oppressive." Id. at 757 (Graves, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 757 (Graves, J., dissenting).
51 The Food and Beverage Association had argued that the ordinance was uncon-
stitutional as an intrusive extension of the state's police power and that it was void-for-
vagueness. Id. at 752-53 (majority opinion). Property rights figured only in the asso-
ciation's claim that the ordinance "infringe[d] on the right of business owners to
conduct their business without impermissible interference from government." Id. at
752. While this argument may have suggested elements of a regulatory taking, the
association never framed it as such. The court ultimately found the ordinance to be a
valid exercise of the state's police power. Id. at 752; see infra Part II.B. Had the associ-
ation argued more succinctly for the restrictive antismoking law as a regulatory taking,
the court would have moved into an ad hoc determination in examining the above
factors. See supra Part I.B. One can only speculate as to how this determination would
have resulted, but perhaps Justice Graves' opinion would have enjoyed a louder voice
in the decision.
[VOL. 81:3110 4
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, * . [W]hen a businessman is forced to effect an unwanted
smoking policy on his own property, the government is taking part
of his property by regulation.
52
Justice Graves binds use to ownership of property. The government is
essentially aiming to manage privately owned property. Subsequently,
interference with an owner's free use of his property is a taking.
That the restrictive antismoking law may "promote the health,
safety, morals or general welfare of the people"53 does not alter the
fact that it interferes with a bar or restaurant owner's use of his pri-
vately owned property. Furthermore, to call such a restrictive anti-
smoking law a "health provision that merely regulates conduct"5 4
forgets that the law specifically restricts the use of such proprietors'
land. Thus, Justice Graves' reasoning compels the finding that restric-
tive antismoking laws function as land-use regulations.
B. State Police Power
State governments have the power to regulate the health, safety,
and morals of the people.5 5 To promote this general welfare, the gov-
ernment often passes laws that infringe upon the rights of individuals
for the benefit of the greater good. Government takings offer a clear
example. Returning to the example of the homeowner on whose
front lawn the state installed a road sign, 56 note that the homeowner
suffers a permanent physical occupation on his lawn but that count-
less drivers benefit from the road sign's information.
52 Lexington, 131 S.W.3d at 757-58 (Graves, J., dissenting). Justice Graves also
relies on the lessons of history. Borrowing from an eighteenth century case, he writes:
Property rights have crucially contributed to our freedom and prosper-
ity.... [T]he United States Supreme Court noted that the "right of acquir-
ing and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural,
inherent and inalienable rights of men .... The preservation of property
then is a primary object of the social compact."
Id. at 758 (quoting Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795)).
Borrowing next from the twentieth century, Graves writes that "the Supreme Court
stated, 'Property does not have rights. People have rights.... In fact, fundamental
interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty, and the personal right
in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in property
are basic civil rights has long been recognized.'" Id. (quoting Lynch v. Household
Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972)).
53 Id. at 749 (majority opinion).
54 Found. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Cabell-Huntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d
744, 754 (W. Va. 2003).
55 Lexington, 131 S.W.3d at 749.
56 See supra Part I.A.1.
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This ability to regulate, however, may require the government to
compensate the individual, as it would the example homeowner.
Stated simply, just because the government can do something does
not mean that the government can do it for free. While opponents
will admit the above as true, they will argue simply that some regula-
tions, as valid exercises of the state's police power, do not require
compensation. The police power is "[t]he inherent and plenary
power of a sovereign to make all laws necessary and proper to preserve
the public security, order, health, morality, and justice."57 The Su-
preme Court, in Hadacheck v. Sebastian,58 has suggested that, under
the police power, a law protecting society from a public nuisance does
not qualify as a regulatory taking notwithstanding any loss that the law
may occasion.59
In Hadacheck, the City of Los Angeles passed an ordinance mak-
ing it unlawful to operate a brick yard within described city limits. 60
The city was expanding its residential areas. 61 Plaintiff, however, had
purchased land that was, at the time, outside existing city limits and
distant from any dwellings; plaintiff neither believed nor expected
that the property would eventually be annexed as part of the city.62
Though the Supreme Court denied plaintiff any recovery, the
Court states that the "police power of a state cannot be arbitrarily ex-
ercised." 63 The government need not pay property owners for losses
that result from regulations proper under the police power. But when
regulation reaches beyond the police power, the government must
compensate injured property owners.
Restrictive antismoking laws differ greatly from the type of mea-
sure that the Supreme Court upheld in Hadacheck. The ordinance in
question declared brick yards to be a nuisance in "'particular circum-
stances and in particular localities.' "64 To make way for an expanding
residential area, the City of Los Angeles by necessity banned this heavy
industry. Restrictive antismoking laws, however, ban smoking in bars
and restaurants irrespective of both their particular circumstances and
localities. These laws affect bars and restaurants everywhere and, un-
like Hadacheck, are blind to the surrounding areas. Instead, these laws
57 BLACK'S LAW DicrIONARY 1196 (8th ed. 2004).
58 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
59 Id. at 410-12; see supra note 21.
60 Id. at 404.
61 Id. at 409.
62 Id. at 405.
63 Id. at 410.
64 Id. at 411 (quoting Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176 (1915)) (empha-
sis added).
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reach into bar and restaurant owners' property and regulate the land
use therein.
65
While a brick yard may have posed a public nuisance in a residen-
tial neighborhood, smoking within a bar or restaurant does not pose a
public nuisance in any neighborhood-for the most part, one would
have to enter a bar or restaurant before even realizing that people
within were smoking.66 Ironically, restrictive antismoking laws may re-
sult in a public nuisance in forcing smokers outside and onto streets
and sidewalks surrounding affected bars and restaurants. Those in
the surrounding area must deal with the noise and blocked causeways
that such a group of, often inebriated, people is likely to cause. Thus,
restrictive antismoking laws represent arbitrary exercises of the state's
police power and are vulnerable to scrutiny as regulatory takings.
C. Penn Central Analysis
The finding that restrictive antismoking laws function as land-use
regulations beyond the purview of the state government's police
power invites a regulatory taking analysis. Under the Supreme Court's
holding in Penn Central, a potential plaintiff must employ the balanc-
ing factors discussed above 67 to convince the court that a restrictive
antismoking law effects a regulatory taking of his property; the court
will subsequently weigh the evidence in an ad hoc determination on
the facts. Admittedly, these laws aim to protect people in public in-
door areas, including bar and restaurant employees, from the harms
of secondhand smoke. Not surprisingly, the One-Year Review of New
York's restrictive antismoking law found that air quality had improved
in bars and restaurants. 68
65 See supra Part II.A.
66 Neither the operation of a brick yard nor smoking would seem to be a nui-
sance per se.
67 See supra Part I.B.
68 ONE-YAR REvIw, supra note 4, at I ("Air quality in bars and restaurants has
improved dramatically ... ."). Furthermore, the report states that
[t]he Health Department conducted an air quality survey of various indoor
and outdoor locations throughout the City in August 2002, prior to the im-
plementation of the Smoke-Free Air Act. The Department found that the
average air pollution levels in bars that permitted smoking were as much as
50 times higher than at the entrance to the Holland Tunnel at rush hour.
The Department returned to the same locations in May 2003, after the
Smoke-Free Air Act went into effect, and documented substantial improve-
ments in air quality.
Id. at 5. On worker protection, the report finds that "within a short period after the
implementation of the Smoke-Free Air Act, 150,000 fewer adult New Yorkers reported
being exposed to second-hand smoke at work." Id. at 6.
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However, restrictive antismoking laws deny owners full economic
use of their land, notwithstanding the evidence that these laws im-
prove air quality. Restrictive antismoking laws direct an owner as to
how he may use his land, often contrary to the owner's expectations
regarding the property. Moreover, these laws diminish business from
smoking customers and have a deleterious economic impact to the
owner. Applying the balancing factors outlined above demonstrates
that in certain factual scenarios restrictive antismoking laws result in a
regulatory taking and thus require just compensation.
1. Interference with Distinct Investment-Backed Expectations
Regulation that interferes with a property owner's expectations as
to use of his land may constitute a regulatory taking and thus require
just compensation. 69 Two related expectations seem appropriate in
the case of restrictive antismoking laws: one, that an establishment will
benefit from customers coming specifically to smoke; the other, that
no one will deny a bar or restaurant the right to open its doors to
smokers and to allow smoking on the premises. Restrictive antismok-
ing laws may interfere with both of these expectations.
Using New York's smoking ban as the model, the legislature
seems to have consciously avoided interference with the first expecta-
tion. The statute provides exemptions for retail tobacco businesses,
cigar bars, and enclosed rooms that are being used exclusively to pro-
mote and sample tobacco products. 70 This exemption forgets, how-
ever, that owners may have designed a club that offers the ability to
not only make purchases from a cigar bar, but also smoke throughout
the club. Restrictive antismoking laws may deter customers that now
have to smoke such newly purchased cigars either in an enclosed
room or not at all.
Furthermore, the law severely interferes with the second expecta-
tion. It completely prohibits a bar or restaurant from allowing smok-
ing. A bar or restaurant owner may thus argue that restrictive
antismoking laws interfere with a distinct investment-backed
expectation.
To prove this interference, a claimant must overcome the issue of
notice. Because of the long history of smoking regulation,
[b]usinesses dependent in whole or part on patronage by
smokers, and those who invest in such businesses and seek to make
69 See supra Part I.B.1.
70 N.Y. Put. HEALTH LAW § 1399-q (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2005). The statute is
also inapplicable to private areas, such as homes, hotel rooms, membership associa-
tions, and outdoor dining areas (subject to further restrictions). Id.
110o8 [VOL. 81"3
SMOKED OUT
their livelihoods from them, have thus long been on notice that the
value of their investments, and implicitly, the ability to profit from
such businesses, may be affected adversely by continuing govern-
mental efforts to reduce exposure to second-hand smoke.71
By this reasoning, New York's bar and restaurant owners should have
tempered their expectations of a profitable investment with those of
impending government regulation. Subsequently, turning to the leg-
islative history that preceded New York's restrictive antismoking law,
one can examine what notice the state legislature had given such own-
ers. In the findings of a 1989 antismoking statute, the legislature
states that "it is in the best interests of the people of this state to pro-
tect nonsmokers from involuntary exposure to secondhand tobacco
smoke in indoor areas open to the public, food service establishments,
and places of employment. ' 72 This would presumably function as no-
tifying potential bar and restaurant owners that theirs was a "regulated
field" and that "subsequent amendments" would perhaps follow.
What then was a potential investor to make of the legislature's
next finding that "a balance must be struck between safeguarding citi-
zens from such involuntary exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke
and the need to minimize governmental intrusion into the affairs of its citi-
zens"?73 This would seem to indicate that the government would not
unnecessarily intrude upon an owner's free use of his property. It
suggests balancing between restricting secondhand smoke in public
indoor areas and upholding free property rights. Thus, a potential
investor should have anticipated some antismoking regulation but not
an absolute ban.
Owners who had previously invested in separate rooms for smok-
ing can make out a particularly strong case for a regulatory taking
under this factor. Consider the example of Antonio Avanzato, the co-
owner of Stella Luna, a restaurant in Oneonta, New York. He spent
$45,000 in 2000 on "a separate smoking lounge off the bar, a 20-by-40-
foot room with comfortable furniture and humidors. His employees
d[id]n't serve in the room, which ha[d] its own ventilation system." 74
71 D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 292 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(citing In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516, 525-26 (6th Cir. 1996)), affd, 393
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005). "'Those who do business in [a] regulated field cannot ob-
ject if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the
legislative end."' Id. at 972-73 (quoting FHA v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91
(1958)).
72 Act of July 5, 1989, ch. 244, § 1, 1989 N.Y. Laws 2328.
73 Id. (emphasis added).
74 Michael Virtanen, Smoking Waivers a Hard Sell, AIBAYv TIMES UNION, Mar. 21,
2004, at D8.
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Clearly, Avanzato expected smoking regulation and constructed
his bar accordingly, making the necessary investment to protect his
employees and accommodate his smoking customers. Just as clear is
the fact that Avanzato never expected the absolute smoking ban that
came in 2003. Avanzato relied on the state of the law at the time of
his investment only to then suffer economic loss as further govern-
ment regulation moved far beyond what he could have reasonably ex-
pected. As he said, "'July 24th [2003] we had to put up the no-
smoking sign. Basically my $45,000 room turned into a coat room for
the winter .... ,'-75 New York's restrictive antismoking law does not
represent the balancing that an investor should have rightly expected;
it is a "subsequent amendment" that goes too far. 76
By contrast, note that the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio upheld a law that prohibited smoking in
public indoor areas "except in a 'separate smoking lounge' designated
for the exclusive purpose of smoking." 77 While both the State of Ohio
and City of Toledo had restricted smoking in public indoor areas over
twenty-five and fifteen year periods, respectively, the "subsequent
amendment" in question aligned with what a potential investor should
have expected-further regulation.
Restrictive antismoking laws ban rather than regulate smoking in
public. Consequently, the legislature never notified potential inves-
tors that such extreme interference may have been forthcoming. Just
compensation is necessary to account for blocking distinct investment-
backed expectations.
2. Diminished Economic Value
Regulation that diminishes the economic value of privately
owned property may require just compensation for the owner.78
Again using New York's Smoke-Free Air Act as an example, the debate
over diminution in value becomes clear. Property owners argue that
their businesses have suffered as the result of this law. In New York
City, "76 percent of bars and nightclubs experienced a 30 percent de-
75 Id. While denying the applications of thirteen other bar, restaurant, and busi-
ness owners, the New York State Health Department granted Avanzato's restaurant,
Stella Luna, a waiver from the restrictive antismoking law in 2004. Id.; see infra Part
II.D.1.
76 See infra Part II.D.
77 D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 292 F. Supp. 2d 968, 969 (N.D. Ohio 2003),
affd, 393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005).
78 See supra Part I.B.2.
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cline in business" because of the Smoke-Free Air Act.79 Smoking cus-
tomers choose to stay at home or, at least, outside. 80 To some,
especially smokers, this may seem to be the logical effect of the law.
New York State, on the other hand, has proposed that the restric-
tive antismoking law may actually have improved business.8 ' In sup-
port of this tenet, the state offers several pieces of data.82 Between
April 1, 2003, and January 31, 2004, bar and restaurant business tax
receipts, for example, "were up 8.7% from the same period in
2002-2003."83 Furthermore, the Department of Labor finds that the
number of bars and restaurants remained "essentially unchanged" be-
tween the third quarter of 2002 and that of 2003-"an improvement
compared with the same period in 2002, during which 280 more bars
and restaurants closed than opened."8 4
These data seem to take an overly optimistic view of the law's ef-
fects, however. Serious issues exist as to causation. First, the test peri-
ods only loosely correspond to the passage of the state's restrictive
antismoking law. It is consequently difficult to fit the law's influence
on the numbers into the analysis. Second, the state's conclusions for-
get that a number of other factors may have contributed to the im-
proved business figures for New York City's bars and restaurants in
2003-2004.
A more perceptive look at the One-Year Review reveals that the
state itself may not stand wholly behind its own assertions. The report
mentions repeatedly, and yet almost parenthetically, "New York City's
improved financial climate" since the passage of the Smoke-Free Air
Act.8 5 The report cannot mean to suggest that the restrictive antis-
moking law caused this upturn, and so we read the generalization that
79 Adrienne T. Washington, Smoking Bans Could Snuff out Small Bars, Eateries,
WASH. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2004, at B2 ("[L]egislators are considering amendments to the
smoking ban.").
80 Id. ("After a visit in the summer to New York City to watch her then-boyfriend's
band, Ms. Mitchell [public advocate who went on to start the website
www.bantheban.org] said she noticed many people standing on the streets outside
restaurants. Few went in to watch the performance.").
81 ONE-YE.AR REVIEW, supra note 4, at 1 ("One year later, the data are clear. The
City's bar and restaurant industry is thriving .... .").
82 Id. at 2 ("Data from the New York City Department of Finance show that the
amount of money spent in New York City's bars and restaurants has increased over
the past year.").
83 Id. The reader should initially note that the law was not effective until July 24,
2003. See Act of Mar. 26, 2003, ch. 13, § 16, 2003 N.Y. Laws 117.
84 ONE-YEAR REVIEW, supra note 4, at 3. The reader should again note that the
law was not effective until almost the end of this test period.
85 Id. at 2.
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"after a difficult 2001 and 2002, more people are spending more
money in New York's bars and restaurants."8 6 While financial factors
tend to show that bars and restaurants can thrive despite New York's
restrictive antismoking law, an improved economy does not absolve
the state for interfering with owners' property and decreasing busi-
ness from smoking customers. The report concludes:
As New York City, home of the world's finest restaurants and
most celebrated nightlife, emerges from the difficult economic
times of 2001 and 2002, so has its bar and restaurant industry. Eco-
nomic data confirm that New Yorkers love their bars and restau-
rants, and so do the millions of tourists that come here every year to
enjoy all that the City has to offer. Thanks to the Smoke-Free Air
Act, the City's bar and restaurant experience is a safer and healthier
one for everyone.8
7
Thus, the One-Year Review seems ultimately to back off its position that
the restrictive antismoking law improved the bar and restaurant busi-
ness in New York City and instead extols its health benefits, perhaps
only coincidental with the improving city economy.
Having debunked the myth of the law's economically beneficial
effects on the bar and restaurant business, the analysis must continue
to prove that the law has actually diminished the value of the owners'
property. In addition to the statistic offered above in support of eco-
nomic injury in New York,8 8 this Note now expands its analysis to in-
clude a survey of other states and municipalities that have passed
restrictive antismoking laws.
In California, the first state to pass such a law, "[t]here was
talk of California bars being 'raped,' of a sales decline of 26 per-
cent, of 'definitive evidence' and 'conclusive proof that the
smoking ban was an economic nightmare."89 In Maine, business
has declined by thirty percent at some bars, especially those close
to the New Hampshire border;90 New Hampshire has no such
86 Id. at 4.
87 Id. at 6. This Note does not attempt to explain the causes for the "difficult
economic times of 2001 and 2002" or the subsequent recovery, but the effects of Sep-
tember 11, 2001 should be prominent in the reader's mind.
88 See supra text accompanying note 79.
89 Sanders, supra note 2, at 20. A different study found no such effect. Id. How-
ever, "California's ban has not been as devastating ... because it has numerous ex-
emptions and good weather permits owners to operate outdoor smoking sections."
Washington, supra note 79.
90 Chris Churchill, Bar Smoking Ban: Air Cleaner, Business Down, KENNEBEC J.
(Me.), June 3, 2004, at B5 ("'Business is off big-time,' Dick Grotton [president of the
Maine Restaurant Association] said. 'The law continues to be a source of extreme
irritation.'").
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ban.9 1 Montgomery County, Maryland, just outside Washington, D.C.,
has seen "total sales decline an average of 30 percent during the week
and 50 percent during the weekend" in smaller establishments. 92
Moreover, "[o]fficials in Austin, Texas... revoked a ban after its dev-
astating effects on the local economy."93
The economic effect of restrictive antismoking laws is clearly a
hot topic of debate. The statistics offered above would seem to prove
that smoking bans diminish the value of bars and restaurants in re-
stricting their client bases and thus harming the overall business. New
York State, meanwhile, has failed in its whitewashing attempt to show
that the law has improved business in New York City's bars and restau-
rants; it can hope, at most, that the law has had no economic effect.
Admitting this controversy over statistical interpretation, small
and "border" establishments can make out the best case for a regula-
tory taking under the diminution-in-value test. At the very least, it is
hard even for proponents of restrictive antismoking laws to argue that
such bans do not have a devastating economic effect on small bar and
restaurant owners. Some may have a regularly smoking clientele; 94
others may simply not be able to survive the loss of a significant class
of customers. These establishments cannot afford to lose a large
source of their business. It also seems reasonable to conclude that
restrictive antismoking laws diminish the economic value of small bars
more so than that of small restaurants, if only because smoking is tra-
ditionally more prevalent within bars. 95 Similarly, as is the case for
some Maine and Washington, D.C., establishments discussed above, 96
bars and restaurants close to state borders will lose customers who
91 Id. As Washington, D.C., considered a restrictive antismoking law, the same
dilemma emerged because "smokers [will] opt to cross the Potomac River to the to-
bacco-friendly state of Virginia." Washington, supra note 79. This Note does not at-
tempt to examine the question of whether the need for national uniformity in
smoking laws requires federal intervention.
92 Washington, supra note 79.
93 Id.
94 Id. ("Alvin and Adrienne Carter, owners of the popular Hitching Post on Up-
shur Street NW [Washington, D.C.], face a similar fate [to bars and restaurants whose
businesses have suffered as the result of restrictive antismoking laws]. Their small
soul-food restaurant and bar will not survive if they lose their regular clientele-the
majority of whom are smokers.").
95 Id. ("Proponents of smoking bans argue that these bans do not cause eco-
nomic hardship for restaurant owners. But many of the studies do not include places
such as bowling alleys, bingo parlors, pool halls or bars where food is not sold. ...
[M]ost of those studies refer to big restaurant chains, not to family-owned
operations.").
96 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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take their business to the bars and restaurants of neighboring states
and municipalities that continue to allow smoking therein.
Thus, restrictive antismoking laws diminish the value of affected
bars and restaurants, especially small establishments that cannot af-
ford to lose smoking customers and those that will lose customers who
choose to avoid the law by crossing state borders. The diminution-in-
value test supports a finding that restrictive antismoking laws work a
regulatory taking and consequently require just compensation for in-
jured owners.
3. Analogue to Physical Interference
It is imperative to again note that the Supreme Court in Penn
Central states that the "economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has inter-
fered with distinct investment-backed expectations are . . . relevant
considerations" in determining whether government regulation ef-
fects a taking.97 The Court mentions the character of governmental
action factor in what seems to be a tertiary manner.98 Thus, while this
factor appears to be the greatest possible impediment that a potential
plaintiff would face in arguing for a restrictive antismoking law as a
regulatory taking, the court would give primary importance to the
law's interference with distinct investment-backed expectations-the
factor that most strongly supports the argument for restrictive anti-
smoking laws as regulatory takings, as discussed above.99
The character of governmental action factor directs the court to
find a taking when government regulation approximates physical
seizure or invasion of an owner's land. Though restrictive antismok-
ing laws do not involve an actual physical interference with an owner's
land, these laws quickly lend themselves to the legal analogy for which
the court would look in its takings analysis. The clearest example is
again that of an owner such as Antonio Avanzato who has previously
invested in a separate room for smoking. A restrictive antismoking
law essentially ousts the owner from this room through direct interfer-
ence with his property use. Stated differently, the government essen-
tially appropriates an owner's separate room and directs the owner to
use the room for purposes other than smoking-contrary to the
owner's business discretion.
97 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (emphasis
added).
98 Id. (stating as a relevant factor, after distinct investment-backed expectations
and economic impact, "[s]o, too, is the character of the governmental action").
99 See supra Part I.B.1.
1114 [VOL. 81:3
SMOKED OUT
Similar reasoning, though under an admittedly weaker analogy,
applies to "border" establishments.100 Restrictive antismoking laws ef-
fectively remove an owner's property used previously for smoking and
relocates the space across the border to a state that permits smoking
therein. A potential plaintiff must analogize the restrictive antismok-
ing law to an actual appropriation of his property as best he can on
the facts emphasizing not only that every regulatory taking case re-
quires an ad hoc determination, but also that the character of the
government action factor receives only tertiary attention under Penn
Central.
4. Denial of Specific Property Interest
Government regulation that essentially denies an owner a single
estate in his property may constitute a regulatory taking. 0 1 Scholars
have long recognized property rights as a "bundle of sticks."10 2 Each
stick symbolizes a different entitlement in the land. Conceptual sever-
ance would support the finding of a taking anytime the government
seizes an individual stick or property right.10 3 In a regulatory taking,
government action effectively denies an owner a single land-use stick.
Restrictive antismoking laws prevent bar and restaurant owners
from the free use of their property. Sticks within the bundle include
the different rights to use one's land as one chooses. 10 4 These bans
preclude smoking, a land use from which such owners had previously
benefited. Recognizing the admittedly minor right to allow smoking
as a property right, or single stick, it is evident that restrictive
antismoking laws remove this stick from an owner's bundle. While
conceptual severance has met with some skepticism,10 5 the Supreme
100 See supra Part II.C.1.
101 See supra Part II.C.2.
102 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 39, at 1678 ("[Elvery regulation of any portion of an
owner's 'bundle of sticks,' is a taking of the whole of that particular portion consid-
ered separately.").
103 Id.
104 Id. (noting that "[e]very curtailment of any of the liberal indicia of property"
may constitute government seizure of a property right stick from out of an owner's
bundle).
105 See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470,
497-501 (1987) (describing Supreme Court precedent that views property rights as a
whole rather than in discrete segments and declining to treat "coal in place" and
"support estate" as separate property segments of petitioners' coal reserves); Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978) ("'Taking' jurispru-
dence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to deter-
mine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In
deciding whether a particular government action has effected a taking, this Court
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Court has more recently favored this test as part of the takings
analysis.' 0 6
An injured property owner may use conceptual severance to but-
tress his case for interference with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions and diminution in value. The government has effectively
outlawed what was once a legal use of property' 0 7 and consequently
seized a specific right from out of the owner's bundle of sticks. Ac-
cordingly, just compensation is due.
D. Restrictive Antismoking Laws Go "Too Far"
Restrictive antismoking laws result in negative economic effects
and interference with free property use. The problem is "'that the
regulation has in substance "taken" . . . [bar and restaurant owners']
property-that is, the regulation "goes too far."' "108 The government
interest in protecting people from the dangers of secondhand smoke
is clear. Restrictive antismoking laws, however, take this objective too
far without compensation, forgetting the necessary balance with prop-
erty rights.10 9
1. Partial Regulatory Takings and the New York Waiver Provision
Restrictive antismoking laws result in partial, or noncategorical,
takings of restaurant and bar owners' property.110 The bans do not
deny owners all economic use of their land, but the "level of intru-
sion" completely outweighs the "government interest at stake."11' A
survey of recent case law that has examined antismoking laws as regu-
latory takings suggests that restrictive antismoking laws, such as New
York's 2003 ban, may invite such a finding. The courts have refused to
find that laws confining smoking to a designated section within public
focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of
the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole . . ").
106 Radin, supra note 39, at 1678 ("[L]ooking back on the Court's recent takings
jurisprudence, a trend toward conceptual severance is already in progress.").
107 See Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Ur-
ban County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Ky. 2004) (Graves, J., dissenting)
("[T]obacco is a legal product and smoking a legal activity .... ).
108 D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, 292 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971 (N.D. Ohio 2003)
(quoting MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986)
(citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922))), affid, 393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir.
2005).
109 See supra text accompanying note 73.
110 See supra text accompanying note 32.
111 D.A.B.E., 292 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
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indoor areas function as regulatory takings. 12 The New York law,
however, allows for no similar exception; the law effectively bans
smoking in all bars and restaurants.113 As for restrictive antismoking
laws comparable to that in New York: one sparked a vigorous dissent
raising the issue of regulatory takings sua sponte; l" 4 and another
seemingly forgot the possibility of finding a partial regulatory taking
in an overly narrow approach to the issue. 115
Moreover, again looking at New York's restrictive antismoking law
as the model, the legislature has seemingly anticipated this argu-
ment-perhaps even conceded its validity. The New York statute al-
lows for waiver of the ban if: "(a) compliance with a specific provision
of this article would cause undue financial hardship; or (b) other factors
exist which would render compliance unreasonable."'1 16 Any business that
can prove that it lost at least fifteen percent of its profits as a result of
the law can apply for a waiver.' 17 If the restrictive antismoking law has
an adverse economic effect or poses an unreasonable burden on the
bar or restaurant owner's property, both factors indicative of a regula-
tory taking, then he may apply for a waiver. Rather than pay such an
owner his deserved just compensation, the government chooses to lift
the ban on an individual basis. This would seem to remedy the prob-
lem in New York if the government were to give the provision any
teeth.
112 See, e.g., id. at 969 (upholding an ordinance that prohibited smoking in en-
closed public places, "except in a 'separate smoking lounge' designated for the exclu-
sive purpose of smoking"); City of Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P,3d 675, 678 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001) (upholding against regulatory taking challenge a law that "prohibits restaurant
owners from allowing persons to smoke in restaurants except in a designated smoking
area").
113 Limited exceptions apply, though these refer to individual places rather than
separate areas therein. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Nor does the out-
door exception alleviate the problem in the often harsh climate of the Empire State
when compared to its effect in the Sunshine State, California. See supra note 89.
114 Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 757-58 (Ky. 2004) (Graves, J., dissenting).
115 Found. for Indep. Living, Inc. v. Cabell-Huntington Bd. of Health, 591 S.E.2d
744, 754 (W. Va. 2003) ("[W]e find no constitutional violation because ... all economic
use of the property is not destroyed as a result of the regulation." (emphasis added)). No-
where has this Note suggested that restrictive antismoking laws deny a restaurant or
bar owner all economic use of his property. The position is untenable. The court's
narrow finding here forgets not only to apply the balancing factors discussed above,
see supra Part I.B, but also that a partial regulatory taking may exist under lesser
intrusions.
116 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-u (McKinney 2002 & Supp. 2005) (emphasis
added).
117 Virtanen, supra note 74.
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However, as of March 21, 2004, the New York State Health De-
partment had granted only a single waiver, while rejecting the applica-
tions of thirteen other bar, restaurant, and business owners.1 18 At this
time Scott Wexler, executive director of the Empire State Restaurant
and Tavern Association, said that there were around one hundred
waiver applications pending from business owners who could prove
the necessary financial hardship. I I 9 The government thus seems re-
luctant to grant waivers that could alleviate the problem and make
lawsuits unnecessary. Instead, owners denied waiver must argue that
the restrictive antismoking law effects a regulatory taking of their
property and seek compensation from the courts.
That the state has quantified the necessary economic loss may
further affect the takings analysis. For instance, does a fifteen-percent
loss of profits constitute a partial taking again that the government
chooses to avoid, on only a case-by-case basis, in allowing for waiver?
Is the related argument then that a loss of less than fifteen percent
does not sufficiently diminish the property's economic value as to re-
quire waiver or just compensation? Most importantly, perhaps, a bar
or restaurant owner whose business has suffered a fifteen percent loss
in profits but whose waiver application failed can make out a case for a
partial regulatory taking by pointing to the government's own stan-
dard of undue financial hardship.
2. Government Paternalism
A more general reason that restrictive antismoking laws go too far
is "the need to minimize governmental intrusion into the affairs of its
citizens,"1 20 recognized by the New York legislature in 1989. Restric-
tive antismoking laws prohibit some business owners from using their
property as they otherwise would and forget that individual owners
could make the same determination on their own. A Maryland legisla-
tor, in considering a proposed restrictive antismoking law, called such
a measure "'[g]overnment nannyism."'1 2 1 Owners should be free to
make their own decisions, within reason, as to the use of their
property.
For many, the controversy is about choice. In Washington, D.C.,
where legislators recently approved a restrictive antismoking law for
118 Id.
119 Id. Wexler called it "'astounding' that in almost a year the state ha[d] granted
only one waiver" and mentioned also that "the guidance to applicants [wals vague."
Id.
120 Act of July 5, 1989, ch. 244, § 1, 1989 N.Y. Laws 2328.
121 Washington, supra note 79.
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the nation's capital, 122 an opponent had argued that the city "already
'has lots of options,' with more than 200 smoke-free bars and restau-
rants . . . [and another that] allows smoking only after 11 p.m."'123
Nonsmokers can choose to frequent such smoke-free establishments
and thus enjoy the benefits of clean air. Similarly, prospective em-
ployees worried about the effects of secondhand smoke can limit their
job searches to these smoke-free establishments. In cities already
under a restrictive antismoking law, smokers do not have the same
right to choose. To deny this choice again goes too far.124
However, these laws threaten the property rights of owners not
those of patrons; the owners too have lost the right to choose. Justice
Graves points out that both patrons and owners should share in this
choice. 125 Owners, he argues, are better suited than the government
to deal effectively with their clientele as the "American economic sys-
tem works best when individuals are able to put resources to their
most highly valued use."' 26 An owner who chooses to allow smoking
and suffers because others do not "will soon adjust, or go out of busi-
ness." 127 Absent restrictive antismoking laws, some owners will decide
on their own to limit smoking. Remember the example of Antonio
Avanzato and his smoking lounge. 128 Or, consider the owner of a
Maine off-track-betting parlor who, despite a seven percent loss in his
business, said that he would not bring back smoking if voters or the
legislature overturned the restrictive antismoking law because he "'en-
joy[s] coming home not smelling like smoke.'"129 These are choices
122 In January, 2006, the D.C. Council approved the bill, and Mayor Anthony A.
Williams declined to veto. Eric M. Weiss, Williams Lets City Smoking Ban Move on to
Congress for Review, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2006, at B4. The act then moved on to Con-
gress, whose only response was to exempt itself from the citywide ban that conse-
quently took effect in March, 2006. Anne E. Kornblut, All (Pufj) in Favor (Pufj) Say Aye
(W7eeze), N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at WK3.
123 Washington, supra note 79.
124 Id. ("Taking away the options of smokers is too restrictive-maybe even fatally
so-for the small establishments that want and need the business.").
125 Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Ky. 2004) (Graves, J., dissenting). He states:
Since tobacco is a legal product and smoking a legal activity, the private
business owner should have the choice to either prohibit smoking in his or
her establishment, or be permitted and required to warn patrons that smok-
ing is allowed and that second-hand smoke presents a health hazard. Thus,
both the business owner and the customer have freedom of choice.
Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 See supra text accompanying notes 74-75.
129 Churchill, supra note 90.
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that property owners are free to make absent restrictive antismoking
laws. Under these absolute bans, however, there is no freedom to
make the opposite choice.
3. Market Theory
Market theory would similarly support the argument that restric-
tive antismoking laws go "too far." Under this theory, the government
should let the market determine whether smoking is economically de-
sirable or not. 130 In the absence of restrictive antismoking laws, no
one forces nonsmokers to go to bars or restaurants, yet these establish-
ments continue to allow smoking and nonsmokers continue to visit
them; potential employees too are never compelled to work at a
smoke-filled bar or restaurant, but these establishments remain fully
staffed. Normal market operation would reveal that allowing smoking
in bars and restaurants is both economically desirable and profitable.
Government intervention is thus unnecessary and unwanted from
the standpoints of both property owners and customers speaking
through the free market. Restrictive antismoking laws interfere with
the free function of the market and disturb this economic benefit to
owners. Accordingly, restrictive antismoking laws go too far in re-
stricting the use of property, and the government must justly compen-
sate injured proprietors.
CONCLUSION
In the case of eminent domain a state government condemns an
owner's land and the Fourteenth Amendment requires the state gov-
ernment to compensate the owner for his loss. The question of a reg-
ulatory taking is far more uncertain. The law offers very few
categorical rules, and instead litigants and courts are left to argue over
and decide upon the net effect of various balancing factors. Yet, in
applying these factors to restrictive antismoking laws that continue to
grow more prevalent throughout the nation, it seems clear that busi-
ness owners can make a strong case that this government regulation
has effectively taken their property.
Restrictive antismoking laws interfere with owners' expected use
of their property. Bars and restaurants lose smoking customers and
thus suffer decreased profits. The government action is analogous to
130 See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 681, 683 (1973) ("[O]ptimally efficient
patterns of city development would evolve naturally if urban land markets were to
operate free of imperfections; city planning or public land use controls would only
make matters worse from an efficiency standpoint.").
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physical interference with property and denies these owners a specific
land use. Moreover, these laws go too far. The possibility that New
York's waiver provision represents the state legislature's attempt to
foreclose any regulatory taking challenge would seem to counsel in
favor of such a judicial finding. What would a New York court say of
an economically damaged bar or restaurant whose waiver application
failed? What about states with restrictive antismoking laws that do not
allow for such waivers?
Restrictive antismoking laws admittedly promote a legitimate
state interest, but only through a significant intrusion into privately
owned property. The bans erase a business owner's right to deter-
mine how he will use his own land. Just as an exercise of eminent
domain or rezoning (in the absence of a public nuisance) requires
the government to justly compensate property owners, so too must the
government pay bar and restaurant owners whose land these restric-
tive antismoking laws partially take.
Increasing numbers of aggrieved business owners will continue to
come forward as they are forced to shut their now smoke-free and less
profitable establishments to the public, though no court has yet found
a restrictive antismoking law to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, until a court follows in the footsteps ofJustice Graves' dissent 31
and requires the government to justly compensate injured property
owners, people will enjoy the clean air of bars and restaurants as well
as the empty space smokers leave as they exit to have a cigarette. Any-
one walking around New York City on a weekend can attest to that.
131 Lexington, 131 S.W.3d at 757-58.
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